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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether globalization has affected workers’
bargaining power in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1987–
1995 using a sample of more than 20,000 firms. We find little evidence of inter-
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1 Introduction
During the past decades, the labour market consequences of international
integration have been at the centre of lively debate. Antiglobalization protests
surrounding the WTO, IMF and World Bank meetings reveal that many
people fear that they may lose their job or may be confronted with lower
wages because of the threat of fiercer international competition.
Remark: This paper was written while Ellen Brock was a visiting researcher at the Indian
Statistical Institute (ISI, Bangalore) and a lecturer at the National University of Ireland,
Maynooth. We are grateful to N.S.S. Narayana (ISI, Bangalore), Sanjay Nath (ISI, Ban-
galore) and Probhal P. Ghosh (ISI, Bangalore), Torben Andersen (University of Aarhus),
Alison Booth (Australian National University), Freddy Heylen (SHERPPA, Ghent Univer-
sity), Joep Konings (K.U.Leuven), Jacques Mairesse (CREST-INSEE), Hylke Vandenbussche
(Université Catholique de Louvain), Niels Haldrup (University of Aarhus) and participants
at the ETSG Conference (Madrid, 2003), GEP Conference (Nottingham, 2004), Irish Eco-
nomic Association Conference (2004) and SMYE (Warsaw, 2004) for helpful comments
and suggestions. We also benefited from valuable comments of an anonymous referee. All
remaining errors are ours. Many thanks to Koen De Backere for providing the Belgian
firm level data and the foreign direct investment data. Sabien Dobbelaere is Postdoctoral
Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders (Belgium). Financial support from
the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction, contract n˚ P5/21, is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper presents the view of the authors and not the view of General
Electric. Please address correspondence to Ellen Brock, John F. Welch Technology Cen-
tre, 122, EPIP, Phase 2, Hoodi Village, Whitefield Road, Bangalore 560 066, India; e-mail:
ellen.brock@ge.com
© 2006 The Kiel Institute DOI: 10.1007/s10290-006-0066-8
234 Review of World Economics 2006, Vol. 142 (2)
In this paper, we rely on a rent-sharing framework to investigate the
impact of globalization on the workers’ bargaining power in Belgium. We
argue that there are at least two valid reasons for doing so. First, the Belgian
economy is characterized by the presence of wage negotiations between
firms and their workers at the national, the sectoral and the firm level.1
Hence, this makes a rent-sharing framework very valid to explain wages in
the Belgian economy. Second, Belgium is one of the most open economies
in the world. More specifically, the export/GDP ratio equals 85 per cent in
2002 compared to 10 per cent in the United States.2
Theoretically, there exist three channels through which globalization can
influence wages in a rent-sharing framework. International trade can affect
the bargaining outcome through movements in the firm’s financial condi-
tions, the firm’s and the workers’ threat points and the workers’ bargaining
power. While the first two channels have been investigated empirically,3
there is no direct evidence of the last channel so far.
Dobbelaere (2004a), Vandenbussche et al. (2001) and Veugelers (1989)
for Belgium and Svejnar (1986) for the United States point out that there is
a lot of cross-industry variation in the bargaining power coefficient. Svejnar
(1986) and Veugelers (1989) further examine the determinants of this cross-
industry variation. Although a well-developed theory of the determinants
of bargaining power is lacking, these authors link the sectoral bargaining
power parameters to variables relating to the economic bargaining envi-
ronment such as the sectoral unemployment rates and several variables
capturing output market concentration. However, they do not relate the
workers’ bargaining power to globalization. We contribute to the literature
by studying whether the globalization process has led to a shift in bargaining
power from labour to capital. More specifically, we use a two-stage approach
in which we first estimate the workers’ bargaining power for each sector and
each year following Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989). Our unique data
set encompassing the entire population of Belgian firms in the manufactur-
ing industry over the period 1987–1995 enables us to split up our data into
1 The most important level is the sectoral level, although in recent years there has been
a sharp rise in the number of collective agreements concluded at the enterprise level (Eu-
ropean Foundation 2003).
2 The data are obtained from the OECD International Trade Statistics and the OECD Main
Economic Indicators (see http://www.oecd.org).
3 See Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada and Kramarz (2003) for France for the first
channel and Biscourp and Kramarz (2002) and Kramarz (2003) for France for the second
one.
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several sectors. In the second stage, we relate the workers’ bargaining power
of each sector and each year to a broad range of globalization measures
such as trade, outsourcing, tariffs and measures related to foreign direct
investment (FDI).
We find little evidence of international trade and inward FDI having an
impact on the workers’ bargaining power. We find some evidence that tech-
nological change has a positive impact on the workers’ bargaining power.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the theoretical framework and discuss how globalization can affect wages in
a collective bargaining framework through changes in the workers’ bargain-
ing power. Section 3 concentrates on the regression results of the first stage.
Section 4 focuses on the determinants of the workers’ bargaining power and
hence deals with the regression results of the second stage. The paper ends
with a summary of the results.
2 Theoretical Framework
The methodology in this paper borrows from the rent-sharing literature.
Several papers deal with this issue and investigate the link between a firm’s
ability to pay and the workers’ wages. Within this framework, workers no
longer obtain the competitive wage but are able to capture a fraction of the
firm’s profits per worker in the form of higher wages.4
In this section, we first describe the efficient bargaining framework.
Then, we focus on the effect of globalization on the bargaining outcome
through changes in the workers’ bargaining power.
2.1 Efficient Bargaining Framework
The union and the firm are involved in an efficient bargaining procedure
with both real wages w and employment N as the subject of agreement
(McDonald and Solow 1981). The motivation for relying on the efficient
bargaining model is twofold. First, it accords with stylized facts about Bel-
gian industrial relations. Belgian collective agreements do not only deal with
4 In the literature, three models predict a positive wages-profit correlation with firm prof-
itability determining the level of pay: the modified competitive model, the optimal labour
contract model and the rent-sharing bargaining model (Blanchflower et al. 1996). In ac-
cordance with the wage determination system in Belgium, our analysis relies on the rent-
sharing bargaining model.
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wages but also with employment issues like hours of work and part-time
labour policies (Bughin 1996). Microeconomic evidence in favour of effi-
cient bargaining for Belgium has been provided by e.g. Bughin (1993) and
Dobbelaere (2004a). Second, it captures the possibility that firms are not
operating on their demand for labour. In other words, it allows for the fact
that powerful unions may obtain a higher wage without suffering a decrease
in employment, at least in the short run (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
The union is risk neutral.5 Its objective function is specified in a utili-
tarian form: U(w, N) = Nw + (N − N)wa, where N is the employment
level, N is union membership
(
0 < N ≤ N), w is the real wage and wa <= w
is the alternative wage expressed in real terms.
The firm’s utility equals its real profits π, with π(w, N) = ΘR(N) −
wN − F, where R(N) stands for real value added and Θ for a revenue shifter
that depends on product market conditions (product demand) and F for
all other costs associated with production. For simplicity, we assume that
labour is the only variable input for the firm. Hence, F represents fixed costs.
It can be shown that this assumption on the fixed nature of inputs other
than labour does not affect the bargaining outcome provided that union
preferences do not depend on those inputs (Bughin 1996).
The threat point for the union is assumed to equal the alternative
wage wa. If no revenue accrues to the firm when negotiation breaks down,
the firm’s fall-back utility equals −F. The outcome of the bargaining is the
asymmetric generalized Nash solution to:
max
w,N
Ω = {Nw + (N − N)wa − Nwa}φ{ΘR(N) − wN}1−φ , (1)
where φ ∈ [0, 1] represents the union’s bargaining power.
Maximization of (1) with respect to the wage rate w gives the following
equation:
w = wa + φ
1 − φ
[
ΘR(N) − wN
N
]
. (2)
Maximizing (1) with respect to employment N leads to the following first-
order condition:
w = ΘRN + φ
1 − φ
[
ΘR(N) − wN
N
]
. (3)
5 See Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989) among others for the derivation in the case of
a risk-averse union.
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By solving simultaneously both first-order conditions, we obtain an ex-
pression for the contract curve, which results from the tangency between
iso-profit curves and union indifference curves: ΘRN = wa. This equation
shows that the employment level depends on the alternative wage wa but
not on the negotiated wage w (Brown and Ashenfelter 1986).
In equation (2), wages are determined by the outside option and the
profits per worker. However, in the empirical part of the paper we opt to
work with value added per worker as a measure for the firm’s ability-to-pay.
The reason is that the wage variable is present both at the left and right
hand side of (2) and hence will create a downward bias in the estimation of
the parameter (φ/1 − φ). In order to deal with this bias, we decided not to
work with profits but with value added as a measure for firm rents.6 More
specifically, we rewrite (2) and obtain the following expression where wages
are a function of value added per worker:
w = (1 − φ)wa + φΘR(N)
N
. (4)
Although we bypass the ‘direct’ endogeneity problem using value added
rather than profits per worker, value added may also be endogenous. We
will turn to this issue when we turn to the empirical results (see Section 3).
2.2 The Effect of Globalization on Wages through Changes in
the Workers’ Bargaining Power
Theoretically, there are three channels through which product market in-
tegration (globalization) can affect wages during the bargaining process
(see (4)). First, international trade can induce movements in the firm’s finan-
cial conditions through the revenue shifter Θ, affecting the size of the rents
(or the ‘pie’) that can be shared between the workers and the firm.7 Second,
international trade can affect the bargaining outcome through movements
in the firm’s and the workers’ threat points and outside options wa (Biscourp
and Kramarz 2002 and Kramarz 2003 for France). Third, globalization can
affect wages in a collective bargaining framework through movements in
the workers’ bargaining power parameter φ. This third channel is the focus
of this paper.
In the interpretations given below, globalization enters the story through
its effect on the general economic climate and the unemployment level in
6 See also Estevao and Tevlin (2003) and Martins (2004) among others for a discussion.
7 See Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada and Kramarz (2003) for France.
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particular. First, in models where parties discount the future and hence,
where delay of a settlement diminishes the present value of the result,
the workers’ bargaining power will be higher if workers have a lower dis-
count rate than the employers.8 Reasoning in this way, Lindén (1995) de-
fines φ as a measure of labour market tightness, i.e. the ratio of the hir-
ing rate from the unemployed to the sum of the hiring rate and the rate
of filling vacancies in an equilibrium search model. The more impatient
the employer or the tighter the labour market, the higher the bargain-
ing strength of the union and vice versa. Therefore, measures related to
globalization could have an impact on the tightness of the labour market
and hence on the union’s bargaining power. Higher import competition
(export competition) could decrease (increase) the workers’ bargaining
power as the labour market becomes less (more) tight. Second, φ can
be interpreted as the ratio of the parties’ perceived risk that the other
party will leave the bargaining table (Binmore et al. 1986; McDonald
and Suen 1992; Teulings and Hartog 1998). More specifically, the bar-
gaining power of the union and the firm is related to the costs or bene-
fits of both parties in delaying an agreement (Layard et al. 1991; Smith
1996).9 If a bargaining partner receives extra income in case of a disagree-
ment, this partner is more willing to tolerate disagreement and hence
bargains for a larger share of the ‘pie’. In some studies (see e.g. Do-
iron 1992), these costs are interpreted as strike costs in case the negoti-
ating parties use strikes as a dispute resolution mechanism. Among other
things, higher inventories, more liquid assets and lower capital intensity
are shown to reduce a firm’s strike costs and hence to increase its bargain-
ing power (see e.g. Clark 1991, 1993; Doiron 1992). For workers, these
strike costs could be related to the availability of strike funds or tempo-
rary jobs elsewhere. The probability of obtaining this alternative employ-
ment is inversely related to the rate of unemployment in the economy.
Therefore, higher unemployment lowers the unions’ bargaining power.
Other factors, such as globalization, are therefore also able to affect the
union’s bargaining power as these might have an impact on the rate of
unemployment.
An informal theory regarding the determinants of the union’s bargaining
power is given by McDonald and Suen (1992). The authors argue that the
8 Gibbons (1992) refers to the parties’ discount rate as the time value of money, i.e. a dol-
lar received at the beginning of one period that can be put in the bank to earn interest.
9 As discussed by Smith (1996), these costs or benefits can have an effect on the workers’
bargaining power through changes in their relative time preference.
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bargaining power of the workers is related to the amount of support workers
are prepared to give to a wage claim. If workers feel that the wage claim is
unfair, they are less eager to support it. In other words, restricting wages
is felt to be important in periods of unfavourable economic conditions as
large wage increases are considered to be dangerous to economic activity
in general and jobs in particular. One direct indicator of the economic
climate is the level of unemployment which can be affected by increased
globalization.
As one of the first, Rodrik (1997) has pointed out that increased global-
ization has lowered the workers’ bargaining power. More specifically, he
argues that the closer substitutes domestic and foreign workers are, due
to e.g. international trade, outsourcing and FDI, the lower the enterprise
surplus ending up with workers. As a consequence, unions might have
become weaker. Indirect empirical evidence for weaker unions is given
by the study of Slaughter (2001) who investigates the hypothesis that trade
liberalization has contributed to increased labour demand elasticities. Using
sectoral-level data, his empirical results are mixed and show that mainly time
effects determine changes in labour demand elasticities. However, a number
of trade-related variables (such as outsourcing, net exports, etc.) are found
to have the predicted effect on the labour demand elasticity of especially
non-production workers.10 As pointed out by Rodrik (1997) and Slaughter
(2001), finding increased labour demand elasticities in the case of increased
foreign competition could be consistent with a story of a shift from labour
towards capital bargaining power over rent distribution in firms enjoying
extra-normal profits.
A study addressing indirectly the effect of FDI on the workers’ bargain-
ing power is Schreve and Slaughter (2002). They investigate whether FDI
has an effect on the workers’ feeling of insecurity. On the one hand, multi-
national presence can increase the workers’ economic insecurity by raising
the volatility of wages and employment. On the other hand, the authors
argue that workers in foreign-owned firms might get compensated more
because they are facing a higher risk of plant shut down. Therefore, the
impact of FDI on the workers’ economic insecurity is unclear. When the
authors test their hypothesis, FDI is found to increase the workers’ per-
ception of economic insecurity measured as a person’s stress/anxiety about
10 Among others, Bruno et al. (2004) for several OECD countries, Fajnzylber and Mal-
oney (2000) for Chile, Colombia and Mexico, Greenaway et al. (1999) for the United King-
dom, Hasan et al. (2003) for India, Jean (2000) for France, Krishna et al. (2001) for Turkey
and Paes de Barros et al. (1999) for Brazil have also investigated this issue.
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one’s economic misfortune. Hence, they provide evidence of FDI creating
a general atmosphere of uncertainty in which workers might be less likely
to press for higher wages in the form of obtaining a part of the firms’
profits.
Budd and Slaughter (2004) and Budd et al. (2005) analyse the impact of
increased globalization on workers’ bargaining power in another context.
They investigate whether rent sharing extends across national borders, con-
ditioned by corporate or labour organizational ties and/or by trade unions.
Their empirical results provide strong evidence of international dimensions
of rent sharing.
In this paper, we further investigate whether globalization has indeed
an effect on the workers’ bargaining power as first pointed out by Rodrik
(1997). We use a broad range of globalization measures such as trade,
outsourcing, tariffs and measures related to FDI. In the next section, we
proceed with the stage-one regressions where we estimate the workers’
bargaining power parameters. Subsequently, we relate these parameters to
several globalization measures.
3 Stage-One Regressions: Estimating Workers’ Bargaining Power
To identify the effect of international trade on the workers’ bargaining
power, our estimation strategy consists of two stages. In the first stage,
we estimate the workers’ bargaining power φ for 15 sectors in the Belgian
manufacturing industry over the period 1987–1995. In the second stage,
we regress the estimated workers’ bargaining power coefficients on several
measures of trade, FDI, technology and control variables. These stage-two
regressions try to identify the factors explaining the workers’ bargaining
power.
3.1 Specification and Data Description
The econometric specification that acts as the basis for the stage-one regres-
sions is derived from (4) and is given by:
wijt = αi + δ1 ln wjt + φ
(
VA
N
)
ijt
+ αt + εijt , (5)
with φ the workers’ bargaining power. Index ijt stands for firm i in sector j
at time t.
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To estimate (5), we use an unbalanced panel of the entire population of
Belgian firms in the manufacturing industry over the period 1987–1995. All
variables are taken from annual company accounts that are collected by the
National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The dependent variable is the average real
annual wage in firm i. In our empirical analysis, the workers’ outside option
(wa in (4)) is proxied by the real minimum wage per worker of the sector
in which the firm operates (see e.g. Veugelers 1989 and Vandenbussche
et al. 2001). We also experimented with the average real annual wage per
worker and the sectoral unemployment rate as a measure for the workers’
alternative wage.11 Our estimates of the φ parameter turned out to be robust
to whether the first or the second measure of the alternative wage is used
in our estimations where we pool all firms together. Since the data of the
sectoral unemployment rate are however less disaggregated in comparison
to the data of the minimum wage, it is not possible to use this variable
together with the average real annual wage per worker when we turn to
our estimations of the φ parameter for each sector separately year by year.
Therefore, we opted to take the real minimum wage per worker of the sector
in which the firm operates.12 To capture the firm’s financial conditions, we
use value added that is constructed from the company accounts database
as sales minus material costs. This measure reflects economic rents instead
of accounting rents. Although we decided to focus on value added as a rent
measure, we also report some consistency checks using both economic and
accounting profits. More specifically, economic profits are constructed as
value added minus the wage bill (see e.g. Blanchflower et al. 1996) while
accounting profits are directly taken from the company accounts database.
All annual wages are expressed as real wages, i.e. nominal wages divided
by the consumer price index with 1990 as reference year. The consumer
price index has been drawn from the Belgostat source of the NBB.13 Value
added is also expressed in real terms, i.e. nominal value added divided by the
sector-specific producer price index. The producer price index is obtained
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs.14 Average wages and value added are
11 The unemployment variable is obtained from the Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening
(RVA).
12 This variable is constructed at the four-digit NACE classification, while the other proxy
for the alternative wage is determined at the two-digit sectoral classification that matches
closely our 15 sectors that are used to estimate sectoral bargaining power parameters that
vary year by year (see Appendix A).
13 These data can be downloaded from http://www.nbb.be/belgostat/.
14 These data can be downloaded from http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be.
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constructed by dividing annual labour costs and value added by the average
number of employees in each firm for each year respectively. εijt represents
a white noise error term and αi individual firm effects. We also include time
dummies to capture possible unobservable aggregate shocks common to all
firms in a given year (αt).
Our data are expressed in levels rather than in logs. The reason is that
specification (5) is most consistent with our theoretical model and using
logs would drop loss-making firms from our sample. Table 1 includes some
summary statistics of the key explanatory variables for the period 1987–
1995. This table clearly shows that the rent-sharing variable is more volatile
than the wages.
Table 1: First-Stage Regression: Summary Statistics
Variables 1987–1995
No of. obs. Sample mean Sample st. dev.
Firm-average real wage per worker
(×100 000 BEF) 140,434 9.699 4.840
Firm-average real value added per
worker (× 100 000 BEF) 139,681 16.266 32.326
Sector-average real minimum wage
per worker (× 100 000 BEF) 140,434 1.992 1.630
Source: Own calculations.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
To exploit the data’s panel aspect, we estimate (4) using two approaches
to balancing time-series and cross-sectional pooling. The first approach
pools all 15 sectors over all years. This yields one manufacturing-wide
rent-sharing parameter φ over the period 1987–1995. However, since the
Belgian economy is characterized by a high degree of industry-level bar-
gaining between employer associations and unions that are strongly
organized per sector, a cross-section study of bargaining power is appro-
priate. Therefore, to allow some variation within manufacturing and over
time, the second approach provides estimates of φ for each sector sepa-
rately year by year. The latter estimates are used in the second-stage regres-
sion where we try to identify the determinants of the workers’ bargaining
power.
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Ordinary least squares estimates of (5) will be biased for basically three
reasons. First, efficiency-wage theory explains how higher wages might
induce more productive workers such that rents are also determined by
wages. Second, the estimates of φ will be biased if rents per worker are
measured with error as it might be difficult to accurately measure what
financial conditions workers are concerned with (Estevao and Tevlin 2003).
Measurement error can also be caused by the level of employment that is
entering both the wage and profit per worker variables (see Van Reenen
1996 among others for a discussion). Third, a simultaneity issue occurs
if the assumption of efficient bargaining is relaxed and a right-to-manage
model is used. In this model, both the workers and the firm bargain over
the wage but the firm unilaterally determines the employment level. In this
case, the employment level of the firm is related to the wage rate instead of
the alternative wage like in the efficiency wage model.
In other words, performing an OLS regression on (5) would lead to
an endogeneity bias. One way to deal with this bias is to find appropri-
ate instruments that are correlated with the rent-shifting parameter Θ and
do not influence wages. However, Bound et al. (1995), Staiger and Stock
(1997) and Oswald (1996) discuss several difficulties in finding appropri-
ate instruments. Another route is to follow a recursive equation approach
where wages are regressed on lagged values of profits per worker. Hence,
movements in previous internal conditions are treated as predetermined.15
In what follows we choose this approach. More specifically, we regress wages
on the one-year lagged value added per worker.16
3.3 Empirical Results
In this section, we discuss the empirical results of the two approaches.
3.3.1 First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years
In this section, we provide manufacturing-wide estimates of the rent-sharing
parameter over the whole period. As we have panel data, we first tested using
15 As a robustness check, we also performed two-stage least squares estimates where we
used the one-period lagged value of the value added per worker variable as instrument.
These results, which are available upon request, are in line with the recursive equation esti-
mates and show slightly higher estimates. See Blanchflower et al. (1996), Budd and Slaugh-
ter (2004), Christofides and Oswald (1992).
16 Using higher order lags, our results did not turn out to be statistically significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
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Table 2: Wage Equation, First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years
Estimation method (1) (2)
Value added per worker 0.073∗∗∗ (0.013) —
Value added per worker t−1 — 0.019∗∗∗ (0.004)
Sectoral minimum wage 0.090∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.011)
Year effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 139,681 108,894
R2 0.09 0.01
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per
worker.
Hausman tests whether the fixed effects or the random effects model should
be used. In all cases, these tests indicated that the fixed effects model is more
appropriate. In the first column of Table 2, we report the fixed effects results
using the contemporaneous value of the value added per worker variable. All
our estimations are reported using White-heteroscedastic standard errors.
The estimated rent-sharing parameter amounts to 0.07 and is highly sig-
nificant. This point estimate clearly shows that symmetric Nash bargaining,
in which case we would have a coefficient of the bargaining power equal to
0.5, can easily be rejected. In the second column, we use the one-year lagged
value added per worker. We find a rent-sharing parameter of 0.01 that is
lower than the rent-sharing coefficient without using lags. Calculating the
implied elasticities based on these regression coefficients, we multiply the re-
gression coefficients with the average of the value added per worker divided
by the average wage per worker (16.266/9.699, see Table 1). In the case of
the contemporaneous value added measure, the wage-profit elasticity equals
0.12 while this elasticity equals 0.03 when the lagged rent-sharing variable
is used. Calculating Lester’s range that is a measure for profit-variability
explaining wage-variability, we find that the variability in value added per
worker explains about 47 (12) per cent of the wage variability in case the
contemporaneous (one-period lagged) value added per worker is used.17
17 If one assumes a distribution of rents that is four standard deviations wide, then the
range of value added per worker is 129,304 or 7.943 relative to the mean of value added
per worker. Multiplying this with the elasticity of 0.12 (0.03) when the current (one-period
lagged) value of value added per worker is used, we obtain a range of 95 (23) per cent.
Considering the ratio of the mean versus the standard deviation of wages of 2, we obtain
that profit variability explains about 47 per cent (95/2) of wage variability in case current
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Focusing on the sectoral minimum wage, we find that a higher sectoral
minimum wage per worker induces higher firm-level wages per worker.
In what follows, we also report three consistency checks. In the first
consistency check, we use economic profits as a measure of rents. More
specifically, we subtract the firm’s wage bill from value added and divide by
the firm’s employment level. Our rent-sharing coefficients drop consider-
ably. Without considering lags, we obtain a small but positive statistically
insignificant coefficient of 0.01. As explained before, the ‘direct’ endogene-
ity bias might be an explanation for this result. When using lags of the
economic profit measure, the coefficient becomes positive and statistically
significant but is very low and equals 0.005 (see also Martins 2004, for
similar results). Our firm-level data set also contains accounting profits.
Running the regressions using these accounting measures, we found that
the contemporaneous value and the one-period lag of the profit measure
are not statistically significantly different from zero.18
For the second consistency check, we regressed the log of the firm-
level wages on value added per worker as is done in quite a few papers.
We argued that using levels instead of logs is more consistent with our
theoretical model. Moreover, the log of wages is rather used in studies with
worker-level data rather than firm-level data (see e.g. Budd et al. 2005). Our
regression results using the lag of the value added per worker variable, leads
to a rent-sharing coefficient of 0.001 implying a wages-profit elasticity of
0.01 that lies in line with our earlier elasticity of 0.03 in our levels specifi-
cation.
The third consistency check introduces capital intensity per worker as
an extra variable in regression equation (5). The reason is that our firm-
level data set is not able to control for worker characteristics. We therefore
follow Budd et al. (2005) and Martins (2004) and use capital intensity
per worker as a proxy for observable wage controls. Bronars and Famulari
(2001) argue that capital-intensive firms are more likely to hire workers with
higher observable and unobservable skills. Therefore, higher rent-sharing
coefficients might pick up higher unobserved ability. Our capital intensity
variable turned out to be positive but only statistically significant in the
regressions using the one-year lagged value added per worker variable. More
importantly, our rent-sharing coefficients did not change in comparison to
rent-sharing variables are used while this number equals 12 per cent (23/2) when lagged
rent-sharing variables are used.
18 Using higher order lags, the profit-sharing coefficients also turned out to be statistically
insignificant.
246 Review of World Economics 2006, Vol. 142 (2)
our specification without the capital intensity variable.19 In what follows,
we only focus on the specification excluding the capital intensity variable.
3.3.2 Second Approach: Per Sector and per Year
So far, we have restricted all sectors to share the same rent-sharing param-
eter. To investigate whether rent-sharing behaviour differs across sectors,
we performed F-tests. More specifically, we created interaction terms where
we interacted value added per worker with dummies that vary according
to sector and year. These F-tests reject the poolability across sectors and
years.20 Therefore, to address the important issue of heterogeneity in work-
ers’ bargaining power across sectors, we first split up the manufacturing
industry into 15 sectors. An overview of the different sectors is given in
Table A1 of Appendix A. The sectoral classification is based on the avail-
ability of the sectoral classification of the variables used in the second stage
and the availability of the number of firms within each of these sectors.
For each sector-year, we regress firm-level wages per worker on firm-
level value added per worker. When the one-period lagged value of value
added per worker is used as explanatory variable, the results show that
about 80 per cent of the estimates are statistically significant with 70 per
cent of the estimates statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.21 The
rent-sharing parameters vary considerably over time and over sector. Table 3
gives, for each sector, the summary statistics of the estimated rent-sharing
parameters.22 Considering the estimates of all sectors, we observe that the
mean of the estimated rent-sharing parameter amounts to 0.128 and the
standard deviation to 0.066. The mean value is highest for the sectors office
and computing machinery, electrical machinery and professional goods and
other transport equipment and amounts to 0.188 and 0.183 respectively. In
the sector of manufacture of pulp, paper and board, the mean is lowest. It
is in this sector that we even find two negative values. However, only one
rent-sharing coefficient is statistically significant and the coefficient equals
19 Our rent-sharing coefficients were also robust for our estimations per sector and per
year. However, the sign of the capital intensity variable was in half of the cases negative
rather than positive.
20 The F-statistic equals F(119, 86 126) = 3.11. The same result is obtained by Dobbe-
laere (2004a) for Belgium but only variation in the bargaining power across sectors and
not across time is tested.
21 Results not reported, but available upon request.
22 More detailed estimates are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 3: Wage Equation, Second Approach: Bargaining Power per Sector and
per Year
Sector Sector name Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
All All sectors 0.128 0.066 −0.0005 0.309
1 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.128 0.054 0.006 0.189
2 Textiles 0.139 0.047 0.073 0.19
3 Wearing apparel and leather
and products
0.151 0.029 0.100 0.187
4 Wood products and furniture
and fixtures
0.142 0.060 0.062 0.233
5 Manufacture of pulp, paper
and board
0.007 0.017 −0.0005 0.050
6 Printing and allied industries 0.132 0.039 0.073 0.205
7 Chemical industry and man-
made fibres
0.124 0.061 0.043 0.204
8 Rubber and plastic products 0.119 0.032 0.068 0.167
9 Non-metallic mineral
products
0.103 0.027 0.066 0.144
10 Basic metal industries 0.085 0.054 0.013 0.164
11 Metal products 0.158 0.042 0.095 0.232
12 Non-electrical machinery 0.146 0.076 0.053 0.259
13 Office and computing ma-
chinery, electrical machinery
and professional goods
0.188 0.049 0.117 0.264
14 Other transport equipment 0.183 0.098 0.059 0.309
15 Other manufacturing 0.118 0.070 0.026 0.210
−0.0005. Considering the time-variation in the rent-sharing parameters,
no clear trend that is uniform across sectors can be discovered as for some
sectors the rent-sharing parameter increases while for other sectors the
rent-sharing parameter declines between 1989 and 1995.
4 Stage-Two Regressions: Determining the Workers’ Bargaining
Power
4.1 Specification and Data Description
The empirical methodology for the stage-two regressions borrows from
Slaughter (2001) who investigates the impact of international trade on
labour demand elasticities. As pointed out by Svejnar (1986), no litera-
ture exists on an appropriate functional form of the determinants of the
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workers’ bargaining power. In other words, we could not estimate one or
more structural equations based on a theoretical model. Therefore, we es-
timate a reduced-form equation of estimated workers’ bargaining power
parameters φ on several explanatory variables derived from an implicit
structural model.
More specifically, we use the following reduced-form regression:
φ̂jt = Xjtk+1βk+1 + λj + λt + ξjt , (6)
with φjt a set of estimated rent-sharing parameters obtained from the first-
stage regressions with subscripts j and t denoting sector and year respec-
tively. Xjtk+1 refers to a vector of explanatory variables that vary by sector-
year, with k representing the total number of explanatory variables. λj refers
to a sector-specific dummy for sector j, λt to a time dummy for year t and
ξjt represents the error term. The sector dummies capture variables that
are sector-specific and time-invariant such as differences in job type and
the type of product in a certain sector, differences in union density etc.23
The time dummies control for factors that change the workers’ bargaining
power over time such as government measures, the national unemployment
rate, taxes, interest rates, etc.24
Table 4 provides summary statistics for our explanatory variables. These
variables are at the sectoral level and are constructed such that they match
the sectoral classification of the second approach of the first-stage analysis.
Table A1 in Appendix A gives an overview of the sectoral classification used
to determine the workers’ bargaining power per sector each year. More spe-
cifically, we have five variables related to international trade, three variables
related to FDI, three technology variables and four control variables. Some
of these variables have been used in earlier studies of the determinants of
workers’ bargaining power (see e.g. Svejnar 1986 and Veugelers 1989). As
argued before, we further analyse this issue and introduce a richer speci-
fication such that we are able to investigate whether globalization has an
effect on the workers’ bargaining power. In what follows, we describe the
explanatory variables of (6) together with their hypothesized effect on the
workers’ bargaining power. This effect is also shown in the last column of
Table 4.
23 See e.g. Doiron (1992), McDonald and Suen (1992) and Smith (1996) for a further dis-
cussion on these issues.
24 See e.g. Doiron (1992) and Svejnar (1986) for a discussion.
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Table 4: Second-Stage Regression: Summary Statistics
Explanatory variable No. of obs. Sample Sample Hypothesized
mean standard effect on
deviation bargaining
power (B)
Import(WORLD)/production 120 1.051 1.224 B < 0
Import(OECD)/production 120 0.819 0.627 B < 0
Import(CEE)/production 120 0.006 0.007 B < 0
Import(NICs)/production 120 0.038 0.093 B < 0
Import(other NON-OECD)/production 120 0.222 0.664 B < 0
Export(WORLD)/production 120 0.474 0.608 B > 0
Export(OECD)/production 120 0.847 0.697 B > 0
Export(CEE)/production 120 0.007 0.007 B > 0
Export(NICs)/production 120 0.048 0.146 B > 0
Export(other NON-OECD)/production 120 0.194 0.546 B > 0
Outsourcing narrowa 30 0.170 0.129 B < 0
Outsourcing broada 30 0.360 0.101 B < 0
Tariffsa 30 7.422 3.176 B > 0
Relative number
of foreign-owned firms
105 0.089 0.081 B < 0
Relative employment of
foreign-owned firms
105 0.444 0.237 B < 0
Relative value added of
foreign-owned firms
105 0.400 0.228 B < 0
R&D/output 120 0.012 0.192
B > 0 or
B < 0
Patents/output 120 0.055 0.068
B > 0 or
B < 0
Percentage change in TFP 120 0.036 0.133
B > 0 or
B < 0
Unemployment rate 120 0.130 0.059 B < 0
Short-term unemployment rate 120 0.059 0.030 B < 0
Herfindahl index 120 0.046 0.045
B > 0 or
B < 0
Capacity utilizationb 112 0.788 0.042 B > 0
Skill intensity 120 0.143 0.077 B > 0
a These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995. – b Sector 49 of the NACE-70
was dropped because of data limitations.
Source: Own computation based on data described in Appendix B.
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• Trade variable 1: the ratio of imports to production. The imports consist
of all merchandize trade (intermediate and final goods). We expect that
the higher this measure is in a certain sector, the lower the workers’
bargaining power will be because increased import competition leads to
less favourable labour market conditions such that workers might end up
with a smaller share of the rents.
• Trade variable 2: the ratio of exports to production. Exports also consist
of all merchandize trade (intermediate and final goods). In the case of
export expansion, the opposite result holds: workers are expected to be
able to extract a larger share of the rents in sectors with a strong export
performance. In our regression analysis, we split up our export and im-
port variable to various destinations/origins: OECD countries, Central
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Newly Industrialising Countries
(NICs) and other NON-OECD countries.
• Trade variable 3: narrow outsourcing divided by production. Our out-
sourcing variable is obtained from the Belgian input-output tables and
is defined as intermediate imports (Feenstra and Hanson 1999). Nar-
row outsourcing refers to intermediate imports in a given sector coming
from the same sector (corresponding to the diagonal elements of the
import-use matrix). We expect this outsourcing variable to have a nega-
tive effect on the workers’ bargaining power. Like in many other OECD
countries, a lot of outsourcing takes place in Belgium, mostly of stan-
dardized products. As pointed out by a survey of the Federal Planning
Bureau (2000), lower labour costs in the host country are the main
motive for outsourcing. A priori, we however expect that outsourcing
is accompanied by less favourable labour market conditions for Bel-
gian workers. Consequently, workers’ bargaining power is expected to
be lower.
• Trade variable 4: broad outsourcing divided by production. In contrast
to narrow outsourcing, this measure also includes intermediate imports
coming from other sectors. The expected effect of this variable on the
workers’ bargaining power is the same as for the narrow outsourcing
variable.
• Trade variable 5: refers to tariffs. As discussed in Budd and Slaughter
(2004), tariffs shield domestic markets from foreign competition. As
a consequence, we expect a positive link between tariffs and the work-
ers’ bargaining power.
• FDI variable 1: the number of foreign-owned firms relative to the total
number of firms. We have experimented with several variables related
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to inward FDI.25 As pointed out by Boeri et al. (2001), the effect of
FDI on the workers’ bargaining power in Europe depends on the mo-
tives for FDI. If product market capture or market expansion is the
main motive, workers might end up in a stronger bargaining position.
If FDI is however motivated by labour market considerations, workers
bargaining power might be diminished as firms can claim to shift pro-
duction abroad. Since the Belgian domestic market is rather small, it
is less likely that product market considerations will be the main mo-
tivation for inward FDI flows. Consequently, the effect on the workers’
bargaining power is expected to be negative. In a related context, Budd
and Slaughter (2004) and Dobbelaere (2004b) investigate whether rent
sharing is dependent on the firm’s ownership structure. The empiri-
cal results of the former study reveal that rent sharing is not higher in
multinational enterprises. The authors argue that this result stems from
additional complexities of multinational ownership. An alternative ex-
planation is given by the footloose nature of multinationals firms. As
mentioned above, the idea is that multinationals can shift their produc-
tion partly or entirely to another country in case the present circum-
stances are unfavourable (Caves 1996).26 Focusing on Bulgaria, Dobbe-
laere (2004b) finds that rent sharing is far less pronounced in foreign
firms compared to state-owned firms. The author points to the high value
added profile of foreign firms and their footloose nature as potential
explanations.
The footloose nature of multinational companies is further documented
by Bernard and Jensen (2002) for the United States, Fabbri et al. (2003)
for the United Kingdom and Görg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland. These
authors basically find that multinational companies are more likely to shut
down operations compared to domestic firms or non-multinationals.
While direct evidence of the footloose nature of multinationals in the
Belgian economy is lacking, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) find that
inward FDI discourages entry and stimulates exit of Belgian domestic
entrepreneurs. However, this crowding-out effect might be moderated
25 Because of data availability, we are not able to test for the effect of outward FDI on the
workers’ bargaining power. As pointed out by Slaughter (2001), this measure can be used
as an alternative proxy for outsourcing.
26 For Belgium, the loss of union power due to increased firm mobility is exemplified by
the Renault case. In 1997, the Renault plant in Vilvoorde (Belgium) was closed at the same
time as the plant in Valladolid (Spain) was expanded. Union reactions to the relocation
were fierce, partly because the closure was unanticipated and partly because of the global-
ization aspect (Kuhlmann 1998).
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or even reversed in the long term because of learning, demonstration,
networking and linkage effects between foreign and domestic firms.
• FDI variable 2 (and 3): refers to the employment (value added) of foreign-
owned firms relative to the total employment (value added). The expected
effect on the workers’ bargaining power is the same as that for the first
FDI variable.
• Technology variable 1: investment in Research and Development (R&D)
divided by production, used as a measure for innovative input. It is often
argued that technological change, instead of international trade, lies at the
basis of changes in the labour market (e.g. Berman et al. 1994; Krugman
and Lawrence 1996). The effect of technological change on the workers’
bargaining power is ex ante unclear. As discussed in Betcherman (1991),
technological change can have an effect on the distribution of the ‘pie’ be-
tween employers and employees by affecting the nature of the production
process.27 First, Betcherman (1991) argues that workers will have more
bargaining power in case labour costs do not constitute a large part of the
firm’s total costs. The reason is that when labour costs are less important,
an increase in the price of labour will not induce a large increase in the
production price and hence will not exert a strongly negative effect on the
firm’s product demand. The author states that the impact of technological
change on the importance of labour costs is a priori unclear and depends
on the type of technological change. Second, he points out that the work-
ers’ essentiality in the production process is another channel through
which the impact of technological change on the workers’ bargaining
power can be explained. When employees are essential to production, they
have strong bargaining power during wage negotiations. The essentiality of
workers in the production process depends on how critical their skills and
their knowledge are and how costly a strike would be for the firm. Techno-
logical change can affect the workers’ essentiality although the direction
of the effect is again not clear. On the one hand, technological change can
be labour-demanding in the sense that the introduction of new produc-
tion processes and technologies necessitates more labour input. On the
other hand, technological change can also be labour-saving when invest-
27 This author however proxies the workers’ bargaining power by the union/non-union
wage differential. Moreover, he uses a story of shifts in labour demand elasticities to ex-
plain the effect of technological change on the workers’ bargaining power. A related study
by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) develops the argument that the nature of the production
process in terms of complementarities and substitutability of workers in production affects
the workers’ bargaining power.
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ment in new technology requires less labour input. The latter mechanism
could be very important in Europe in general and Belgium in particular
where high labour costs prevail (Abraham and Verret 1996). The empir-
ical results of Betcherman (1991) reveal that the bargaining strength of
blue-collar workers is lower in firms which introduced process computeri-
zation. Skilled workers also lose bargaining power but general occupations
strengthen their bargaining position in case of process computerization.
• Technology variable 2: patents divided by production, a measure related
to innovative output. The expected effect of this variable on the workers’
bargaining power equals the one of the first technology variable.
• Technology variable 3: the percentage change in Total Factor Productiv-
ity (TFP), used as a measure of technological change. Again, we expect
a priori the same effect on the workers’ bargaining power as for technology
variables 1 and 2.
• Control variable 1: the sectoral unemployment rate. This variable has also
been used by other authors investigating the determinants of workers’
bargaining power.28 As already discussed in Section 2.2, we expect a nega-
tive coefficient for this variable. We also experiment with the sectoral
short-term unemployment rate as an alternative. During wage negoti-
ations workers might be more concerned with short-term unemployment
than with total unemployment. The reason is that short-term unemployed
people are more readily employable, and therefore better alternatives for
existing workers. Short-term unemployed people refer to those who be-
came unemployed less than one year ago.
• Control variable 2: the Herfindahl index, representing the sum of the
squares of market shares of firms in an industry (Martin 1993: 165).
A higher Herfindahl ratio is consistent with less fierce product mar-
ket competition. As discussed in Veugelers (1989), higher output mar-
ket concentration enables non-competitive pricing behaviour. Therefore,
producers are less sensitive to wage increases since they can shift cost in-
creases to domestic consumers. In other words, a higher Herfindahl index
is expected to exert a positive impact on the workers’ bargaining power.
However, Veugelers (1989) also argues that more market power in the
product market could be transferred to power positions in the input mar-
ket such that the workers’ bargaining power would be eroded. Therefore,
the effect of the Herfindahl index on the workers’ bargaining power can go
in both directions and depends on which of the two mechanisms prevails.
28 See among others, McDonald and Suen (1992), Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers 1989.
254 Review of World Economics 2006, Vol. 142 (2)
• Control variable 3: the sectoral capacity utilization ratio. This variable
captures the general state of the economy. A higher capacity utilization
ratio reflects a better economic situation and hence should allow workers
to press for higher wages. We therefore expect a positive coefficient for
this variable.
• Control variable 4: the skill intensity. This variable refers to the ratio of
skilled versus total employment in a sector. Skilled workers are defined
as those who obtained higher education. The effect of skill intensity on
the workers’ bargaining power is a priori unclear. On the one hand, one
could expect that the workers’ bargaining power is increasing in educa-
tion since skilled workers are harder to replace than unskilled ones and
hence are more powerful (Kramarz 2003). On the other hand, Acemoglu
et al. (2001) argue that the bargaining power of unions decreases with
the share of skilled labour. This is because of the higher outside options
for skilled workers which undermines the coalition among skilled and
unskilled labour in support of unions (OECD 2002).
4.2 Estimation Strategy
As indicated earlier, our estimation strategy closely follows the empirical
methodology of Slaughter (2001) who investigates the effect of international
trade on labour demand elasticities.29 While other authors investigating the
determinants of the union’s bargaining power have estimated one single
equation (see Doiron 1992; Svejnar 1986; Veugelers 1989 among others),
we prefer to estimate (6) using each of the explanatory variables separately.
As pointed out above, the reason is that there is no formal theory explaining
the workers’ bargaining power. In what follows, we discuss three important
issues regarding our estimation strategy.
The first issue deals with the exogeneity of the regressors. Variables re-
lated to international trade and technology are endogenously determined
inputs. Regarding the trade variables, we expect our tariff measure to be
the most exogenous variable.30 To tackle the endogeneity problem, we
adopt several solutions such as (1) introducing lags of the trade and tech-
nology variables and (2) using instrumental variables (IV) where these
variables are instrumented with their lags. The two estimation techniques
29 Paes de Barros et al. (1999) also rely on the two-stage strategy to estimate the effect of
international trade on labour demand elasticities.
30 See also Haskel and Slaughter (2003) for a discussion.
Brock/Dobbelaere: Has International Trade Affected Workers’ Bargaining Power? 255
produced similar results. We decided to report the estimates using the
lags.
The second issue handles the fact that the dependent variable in (6) is
a parameter which is estimated in the first stage. Therefore, the error term
in this equation is heteroscedastic with zero mean and variance equal to
the variance of the error term from the true regression plus the variance
of the estimated bargaining power of the workers φ. Following Anderson
(1993) and Slaughter (2001), we correct for this form of heteroscedasticity
by weighing less heavily those observations for which the estimated variance
of the bargaining power is larger. More specifically, we perform an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression on (6) from which we take the squared
residuals. Subsequently, we regress these squared residuals on the estimated
variance of the bargaining power coefficients, together with these estimated
variances squared and cubed. Finally, we use the inverse of the predicted
values of this regression as weights in an OLS regression of (6).
The third issue is related to our regression specification. First, there
is no real theoretical model predicting which variables to use in a regres-
sion equation explaining workers’ bargaining power. As pointed out above,
we perform univariate regressions. This avoids potential multicollinearity
problems between the explanatory variables. As a robustness check, we
also estimate (6) using various significant explanatory variables from the
univariate regressions.
4.3 Empirical Results
Table 5 reports the regression results of (6), using one single explanatory
variable each time. For the trade (except outsourcing and tariffs), technology
and inward FDI variables, the one-period lagged values are used in the OLS
regressions.
We have estimated (6) with no sector and time fixed effects, only sector
fixed effects, only time fixed effects and sector as well as time fixed effects.
The results reveal that the sign and the significance of the estimated effect of
the variables in the specifications without fixed effects accord with those in
the specifications with only time fixed effects. Both specifications focus on
the inter- as well as on the intra-sectoral variation of the variables. Similarly,
the sign and the significance of the estimated effect of the variables in the
specifications with sector fixed effects equal those of the specifications with
both time and sector fixed effects. When sector fixed effects are included, we
use the time-series information of the variables. In other words, the focus
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Table 5: Second-Stage Univariate Regression Results: Determinants of the Workers’
Bargaining Power
Explanatory variable Hypothesized Time Sector & No. of obs.
effect on fixed effects time fixed
bargaining effects
power (B)
Trade variables
Import(WORLD)/production B < 0
0.004 0.024
120(0.004) (0.020)
Import(OECD)/production B < 0
0.011 0.038
120(0.008) (0.036)
Import(CEE)/production B < 0
0.982 1.038
120(0.659) (1.593)
Import(NICs)/production B < 0
0.036 0.137
120(0.063) (0.247)
Import(other NON-OECD)/production B < 0
0.004 0.036
120(0.009) (0.036)
Export(WORLD)/production B > 0
−0.026∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
120(0.006) (0.041)
Export(OECD)/production B > 0
0.009 0.057∗∗
120(0.007) (0.027)
Export(CEE)/production B > 0
0.948 −1.232
120(0.909) (1.314)
Export(NICs)/production B > 0
0.008 0.027
120(0.043) (0.170)
Export(other NON-OECD)production B > 0
0.005 0.052
120(0.011) (0.046)
Outsourcing narrowa B < 0
0.056 0.288∗∗∗
30(0.095) (0.087)
Outsourcing broada B < 0
−0.036 0.102
30(0.160) (0.145)
Tariffsa B > 0
−0.007∗∗ −0.091∗∗
30(0.003) (0.034)
Inward FDI variables
Relative number of
foreign-owned firmsb B < 0
−0.137∗∗ 0.532
90(0.067) (0.511)
Relative employment of
foreign-owned firms B < 0
0.005 −0.316
90(0.026) (0.454)
Relative value added of
foreign-owned firms B < 0
0.007 −0.014
90(0.026) (0.221)
Technology variables
R&D/output
B > 0 or 0.462∗∗ −1.392
120B < 0 (0.231) (1.680)
Patents/output
B > 0 or 0.137∗ 0.081
120B < 0 (0.078) (0.133)
Percentage change in TFP
B > 0 or 0.044 0.048∗∗
120B < 0 (0.035) (0.022)
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Table 5: Continued
Explanatory variable Hypothesized Time Sector & No. of obs.
effect on fixed effects time fixed
bargaining effects
power (B)
Control Variables
Unemployment rate B < 0
0.121 −0.178
120(0.092) (0.330)
Short-term unemployment rate B < 0
−0.067 −0.289
120(0.183) (0.231)
Herfindahl index
B > 0 or −0.181∗ −0.306
120B < 0 (0.098) (0.256)
Capacity utilizationc B > 0
−0.198 0.006
112(0.133) (0.239)
Skill intensity B > 0
−0.017 0.135
120(0.078) (0.129)
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
a These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995. – b These data are only available
from 1989 onwards. – c Sector 49 of the NACE-70 was dropped because of data limitations.
Source: Own calculations.
is on the intra-sectoral variation of the variables, i.e. on how the workers’
bargaining power moves over time. For the sake of brevity, we only report
in Table 5 the results of the specifications with time fixed effects and both
time and sector fixed effects.
As far as the international trade variables are concerned, we find very
little evidence of international trade having an impact on the workers’
bargaining power. Regarding the import variables, none of the regression
coefficients is statistically significant. In general, most of the regression co-
efficients of the export variables carry the correct sign. We find evidence
that when exports to OECD countries rise, the workers’ bargaining power
is increased. However, considering total exports we find the opposite. Re-
garding the tariff and the outsourcing variables, we find that our statistically
significant variables carry the wrong sign. More specifically, workers in sec-
tors that are shielded from foreign competition in the form of higher import
tariffs are not able to cream off a larger share of the rents.
When controlling for only time fixed effects, our results show that work-
ers have a lower bargaining power in those sectors with a lot of foreign-
owned firms relative to the total number of firms. Before, we have put
forward several explanations for this result.
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For some specifications using our technology variable, strong statis-
tically significant results emerge from our variables of innovative input
(R&D divided by output) and innovative output (patents divided by out-
put) when only considering the time dummies. In those sectors with more
technological change in the form of higher R&D expenditures and more
patents granted, workers are eager to press for higher wages as these work-
ers might be essential in production and/or labour costs might become less
important because of technological change. Considering the specification
with both the time and the sector fixed effects, only a positive statistically
significant effect is found for the TFP variable.
Regarding the control variables, only the Herfindahl index has a statis-
tically significant negative coefficient in the case when only time dummies
are introduced. This indicates that more market power in the output market
is transferred to power positions in the input market such that the workers’
bargaining power is eroded.
We also experimented with regression specifications where we combine
each time one trade variable with one inward FDI variable, one technology
variable and one control variable.31 We find that the overall results are not
sensitive to using these multivariate specifications.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that globalization has affected
workers’ bargaining power in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the
period 1987–1995 by using a rent-sharing framework. We explore the link
between globalization and the workers’ bargaining power by introducing
measures related to import and export competition, outsourcing, tariffs
and inward FDI. Using a sample of more than 20 000 firms, we find little
evidence of international trade having an impact on the workers’ bargaining
power. We provide also minor evidence of inward FDI having an impact
on the workers’ bargaining power. Our results show stronger evidence of
technology exerting a positive effect on the workers’ bargaining power. We
have put forward explanations such as workers becoming more essential in
production and/or declining labour costs because of technological change.
There might be different reasons for finding little evidence of globaliza-
tion affecting the workers’ bargaining power. First, globalization might be
31 Results not reported but available upon request.
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a complex multidimensional issue. Second, globalization might influence
the workers’ bargaining power of different skill groups differently.32 Third,
one could put forward that the workers’ bargaining power is to some extent
a structural parameter. Therefore, the impact of globalization might also
have a structural component, which does not show up when using a rather
short time period. Finally, our results might suggest that globalization affects
labour market outcomes in Belgium via other channels than the workers’
bargaining power. Movements in the firm’s financial conditions or the firm’s
and the workers’ threat points might be more direct channels.33
Appendix A
Table A1: Sectoral Classification for the First-Stage Regressions
Sector No. of firms a NACE-70 NACE-Bel
Sec 1 Food, beverages and tobacco 2,392 41 + 42 15 + 16
Sec 2 Textiles 866 43 17
Sec 3 Wearing apparel and leather and products 869 44 + 45 18 + 19
Sec 4 Wood products and furniture and fixtures 1,380 46 20 + 36.1
Sec 5 Manufacture of pulp, paper and board 227 471 + 472 21
Sec 6 Printing and allied industries 1,883 473 + 474 22
Sec 7 Chemical industry and man-made fibres 492 25 + 26 24
Sec 8 Rubber and plastic products 505 48 25
Sec 9 Non-metallic mineral products 787 24 26
Sec 10 Basic metal industries 85 22 27
Sec 11 Metal products 2,197 31 28
Sec 12 Non-electrical machinery 715 32 29
Sec 13 Office and computing machinery, electrical
machinery and professional goods
883 33 + 34 + 37 30 − 33
Sec 14 Other transport equipment 301 35 + 36 34 + 35
Sec 15 Other manufacturing 435 49 36 − 36.1
a The number of firms in each sector is computed as the average number of firms over the period
1987–1995.
32 Since our data set does not allow us to estimate separate coefficients for the bargaining
power of skilled versus unskilled labour, we can not test the latter hypothesis.
33 Since our globalization variables are defined at the sectoral level, we are not able to
test jointly the effect of globalization on movements in the firm’s financial conditions, the
firm’s and the workers’ threat points and the workers’ bargaining power.
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Appendix B
The sectoral classification for the second-stage regressions is based on Table A1
and covers the period 1989–1995, except for the tariff data, inward FDI and the
outsourcing variables.
The data for the trade variables are obtained from the OECD International
Trade by Commodities Statistics (ITCS). These data are in the Standard Industrial
Trade Classification (SITC) and are converted to the NACE-70 classification with
a correspondence table obtained from the OECD.34 The production data are ob-
tained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database for Industrial Analysis. Our narrow
and broad outsourcing variables are derived from the 1990 and 1995 input-output
tables for the Belgian economy.35 The data for 1990 are in the NACE-clio classifi-
cation for which a conversion was used, while the data for 1995 are in the NACE-
Bel classification (see Table A1 for a conversion to the NACE-70 classification). The
tariff data are based on Messerlin (2001) and refer to the average most favoured
nation (MFN) tariffs of the European Union. These tariff data cover the years 1990
and 1995. For some sectors, the data are more disaggregated than the sectoral clas-
sification of Table A1. Hence, we used sectoral import shares as a weight to con-
struct tariff data based on the classification of Table A1.
Regarding inward FDI, we experiment with three variables: the number of
foreign-owned companies relative to the total number of companies, the total em-
ployment of foreign-owned firms relative to the total Belgian employment and the
total value added of foreign-owned firms relative to the total Belgian value added
for each sector in the manufacturing industry. The Belgian Federal Planning gath-
ers data on all multinationals in the Belgian economy. A multinational firm is de-
fined as a firm that is at least 50 per cent foreign-owned.36
We experiment with three technology variables. We use the sectoral R&D in-
tensity, which is defined as R&D expenditures divided by output, as a measure for
innovative input. The R&D data are obtained from the Dienst voor Wetenschap-
pelijke, Technische en Culturele Aangelegenheden (DWTC, Belgian Federal Science
Policy Office).37 For the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, missing observations are filled
in with the aid of a spline interpolation technique. The data are in the NACE-
Bel classification and are converted to the NACE-70 classification based on NIS
(1997). The production data are obtained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database
for Industrial Analysis. We also use granted patent data as a measure of innovative
output. These patent data are obtained from the EPO (European Patent Office)
and are converted to the NACE-70 classification based on the conversion table
of Verspagen et al. (1994).38 The patent variable used is patents divided by pro-
34 The data were first converted through the International Industrial Classification (ISIC)
and subsequently converted to the NACE-70 based on Schumacher (1992).
35 See http://www.plan.be/.
36 See De Backer (2002) and De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) for a further description of
this data set.
37 See http://www.belspo.be/.
38 Again, the conversion has occurred through the ISIC-classification.
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duction times milliards. The third technology variable is total factor productivity
(TFP). This variable is expressed in indices where 1990 is the base year. The per-
centage change of TFP can be expressed as follows:
Aˆ = (Qˆ − Lˆ) − α(Kˆ − Lˆ) . (B1)
In this expression, the first term reflects the percentage change in the output-
labour ratio. In the second term, α refers to the capital share in production. There-
fore, (1 − α) is the labour share in production, which is calculated as the average
share of labour costs in value added. (Kˆ − Lˆ) refers to the percentage change in the
capital-labour ratio. We construct our capital stock data starting from real invest-
ment data from the OECD (1999) Stan Database for Industrial Analysis and using
a perpetual inventory method following Griliches (1979).39 We first compute an
initial capital stock for 1990. If we assume that both the depreciation rate δ and
the annual growth rate η of investments prior to 1990 are constant, the initial cap-
ital stock K1990 equals:
K1990 = I1990 + (1 − δ)λI1990 + (1 − δ)2λ2I1990 + (1 − δ)3λ3I1990
(B2)
= I1990
(
1
1 − λ(1 − δ)
)
,
where λ = 1/(1 + η). The growth rate η is estimated as the mean annual growth
rate of investments over the period 1985–1990. Like Maskus (1991), we use a de-
preciation rate of 13.33 per cent. After having obtained the initial capital stock,
deflated investment series are accumulated and depreciated from 1989 onwards.
The deflators are calculated from the value added series in the OECD (1999) Stan
Database for Industrial Analysis.
The sectoral unemployment rate is a first control variable and is obtained from
the Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening (RVA). The short-term unemployment
rate is obtained from the Belgian Labour Force and is related to those workers
who lost their job less than one year ago. Another control variable is the Herfin-
dahl index, representing the sum of the squares of market shares of firms in an
industry (Martin 1993: 165). This index lies between 0 and 1. The Herfindahl in-
dex equals 0 if the number of equally sized firms goes to infinity. If a monopolist
exists, the Herfindahl index equals 1. This ratio is computed with the aid of the
Belgian National Bank Balance sheet data using the sales variable. A third con-
trol variable is the capacity utilization rate which is obtained from the Belgostat
database of the Belgian National Bank.40 These data are provided quarterly and
are disaggregated according to the different sectors in the manufacturing industry.
For some sectors, the data are more disaggregated than the sectoral classification
39 A more complete description of how the capital series are constructed is available from
the authors upon request.
40 These data can be downloaded from http://www.nbb.be/belgostat/.
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mentioned in Table A1. First, we compute the average utilization rate in each sec-
tor.41 Some sectors are aggregated up using the value of production as weights. The
sector “Other Manufacturing” (sector 49 of the NACE-70) was lacking. Therefore
we did not use this sector in our estimations.
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